Public health is that branch of preventative medicine in which the community at large has a special interest. When the cause of a neighbor's illness threatens the well being of the entire community or when his disease itself cannot be easily contained then the mechanisms of the state properly intercede. Traditionally public health has articulated two primary, but related goals: the prevention of disease and the improvement of life expectancy. The methods used to achieve these goals have varied throughout history but two basic approaches have dominated the public health effort: monitoring and correcting the environmenta1 causes of illness and arresting the rapid spread of epi,. demic contagion.1
Concern with public health issues certainly dates to classical antiquity as exam!ples of public response to health hazards dot the historical record of ancient Greece and Rome. But the first major efforts in the field belong 10 the MiddJe Ages when epidemic diseases, especially smallpox, tuberculosis, trachoma and leprosy began their horrible peregrinations through western Europe. The isolation of le~rs into specia1 colonies testifies graphically to medieval appreciations of contagion in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In Spain genuine concern with public' health issues is more properly traced to the Black Death (probably Bubonic plague) of the middle of the fourteenth century.
The Black Death hit the Iberian peninsula between 1347 and 1351 with devastating results and was followed shortly by other epidemics in 1361-1363, 13Jl, 1375, and 1396-97. Bubonic plague had originated in Asia, ~rhaps in India, ~rhaps in China. It was carried to Europe, by black rats (Rattus rattus) who managed to climb aboard sailing vessels and who subse-:1 Regulation of medica! practice can be considered a function of public health but this subject will not be treated in this articlé.
quently disembarked in Mediterranean ports. The black rats quickly infected local rodents with the deadly bacillus, Pa.steurella pestis and before the urban rats died the infection was carried from the rodent population to human hosts by fleas sharing the burrows with the rodent population. The sudden presence of thousands of dead rats in a community was an unmistakable sign of impending disastelr. The rapid spread of disease throughout Iberia left some cities with less than half of their original populations. The kingdoms of Arag6n and Catalonia were hit as hard as any regions of Europe. The city of Barcelona, for example, had a population of about 500000 in 1340. Ten years later the number had been reduced to 38000 and by 1377 there were only 20000 residents left in that Catalonian city.2 This demographic devastation alerted the Iberian medical community to the matter of contagiousness and the need for developing a public health policy. The institution of the quarantine emerged as the first result. Ships calling at Spanish ports were sometimes required to remain at anchor in the harbor for forty days (thus the word quaran. tine) before anyone cou1d disembark. At approximately the same time concern with prophylaxis prompted the construction of elementary sewage systems, the cleaning of public 1atrines, a more systematic regu1ation of public market places and slaughterhouses. It also encouraged the development of medical intelligence, and fostered a new cooperation across international boundaries.
These elementary notions of public health were carried to the New World as part of the cultural baggage Spaniards brought with them. They were surely of great significance as on the heels of the initial contact the war between Indian and micro-organism began. European epidemic diseases quickly spelled demographic disaster for native American populations so long isolated from the gene pool of the remainder of mankind. In the core of New Spain public health policy was formulated by the small medical community in Mexico City, most notably Dr. Crist6bal de Ojeda, Lic Pedro L6pez, and surgeon Diego Pedraza in consultation with the recently established Protomedicato. On the northern periphery of the viceroyalty, where formally trained medical practitioners were in very short supply, public health policy was improvised by local officials, sometimes ,vith the prodding of provincial govemors, and in the late eighteenth century of the Commandant General of the Provincias Internas.
Public health on the far northern frontier of New Spain was largelya product of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. There, as elsewhere in the viceroyalty, the causes of the spread of disease ,vere better understood than the mechanisms for effective therapy. It was much easier to preserve one's health than to recover it. Cure was not dismissed as irrelevant but since environmental considerations and contact between healthy and ill persons were recognized as important factors in the spread of disease major emphasis was placed upon prevention and containment, even if it meant that the public good sometimes took precedence over traditional Hispanic concepts of private property and personal liberty.
Most significant in the development of public preventative mledicine were efforts to improve hygienic conditions and to isolate disease pathogens before the vectors could spread the infections to new hosts. Some successes were registered as the vagaries of humans proved rather more manageable thant those of rly understood viruses and bacteria. Public officials knew that human actions could be modified. In some cases the cultivation of healthier hygienic practices required new legislation from the Royal Council of the Indies in Spain, from the Viceroy in Mexico City or from local officials, but in most cases it was simlply a matter of applying principIes wel1 known and enforcing laws long on the books.
Pollution of municipal water sources was understood to be a major contributor to disease and both royal ordinances and local decrees promulgated by town councils addressed the issue. The acequia madre that ran through most towns was used not only for irrigating nearby fields and gardens adjacent to the houses, but also for the potable water needs of the town, for the watering of animals, for the washing of clothes and, because no northern cabildo ackno,vledged the obligation of collecting and disposing of refuse, for sewage and garbage disposal. It is obvious that these diverse uses of the acequia were not entirely compatible with one another.
As early as 1573 King Philip II had issued a set of ordinances on the laying out of new towns and articles 122 and 123 of those regulations specified that all polluting activities were to be located downstream from the town.8 Mining codes also spec., ified that mines could not pollute domestic water supplies. 4 In spite of the good intentions of the statutes enacted in Spain to proscribe pollution of potable water sources, those northerners who lived downstream were often victimjzed by the caretessness of their upstream neighbors as contaminants exceeded the capacity of the natural aquatic ecosystems to breakdown, absorb or recycle the materials introduced. All too often human excreta, kitchen and bathing wastes, and small dead animals dirt. ied the communal water ditch. Chihuahua City found itself with an especially unhealthy situation prompted by an incipient form of industrial pollution. Lead tailings from upstream mines poisoned the municípal system and caused disease.5 Ultimately the town fathers had to construct an entirely new water system. Water sources in Sonora were polluted as weli and at Jeast one doctor attributed his patient's blood disorder in part to the high metallic content in the water .6 In the San Antonio missions, an area of extensive sheep grazing.. the fleeces of filthy and some. times diseased sheep were washed in the acequia following the annual shaving.1
The state of seventeenth and eighteenth century science did not permit the establishment of careful standards for drinkin? water of questio~able purity. Itwas not necessary to count col1-form bacteJ;ia 'Qr to ev~luate c'Onc~ntrations of turbidity to be repulsed by the sight of fecal matter or scum floating on the domes tic water supply. Because filtering methods were prim:,; itive at best, and chemical coagulation centuries in the futute, the only answer was to prevent the contaminati()n at its soutce.
At about the same time that the English Utilitarian theorist Jeremy Bentham was developing his notion of the greatest gOod for the greatest number, the cabildos throughout the far north were beginning to issue ordinances governing the use of acequia water. In Santa Fe, New Mexico people who bathed or engaged in "other filthy practices," ruining the drinking water of those downstream, were fined four reales. The village of San Fernando in Texas had a similar problem but a more imaginative penal.. ty. In 1775 Amador Delgado, the local alcalde, had to outlaw the washing of clothes in the acequia because those living fu'r.. ther down were drinking contaminated water. His order stated provided that no clothes would be washed in thé acequia. Any woman guilty of a violation would have her freshly washed clothes c()nfiscated.8
An even wors~ problem was that of stray animals polluting the acequia. The pigs of San Antonio bore the burden of their owner's carelessness. Anyone who found a pig running lo ose was free to kill and butcher it without fearing legal retribution from the owner.9 The decree, in the long run, was apparently ineffective because some f()rty-one years la ter the town council of San Antonio de Béxar was forced to add to the penalty by levying a fi~e of one peso against anyone who allowed his pigs to ron loose.1° The governor of N ew Mexico, Fernando de la Concha took a much more drastic step. Informed that stray dogs were spreading disease in the Indian pueblos and SpanisIi towns he issued an uncompromising decree: "Mando a todos los vesinos e indios dela Prova, sin distinction alguna de personas, qe desde el mismo día enqe se publique este vando maten o hagan matar cuantos perros tengan en los pueblos, o Plazas The muleteers who brought needed supplies into the towns and villages of the north often left more than the merchant paid for. In San Antonio they tiedup their mules for two or three nights in the plaza behind the church. When they left they felt ?O obligation to clear the plaza of the putrid excrement deposlted by the teams of mules. A local ord,inance passed in early 1809 ordered the muleteers to park their animals outside the village or, if they wanted to use the plaza behind the church, to paya fee of two reales so that someone could be hired to clean up their mess,l2 . Some northem communities, most notably those in California, developed some simple pollution control systems. A laundry tank (lavandería), two or three feet wide and a couple of feet deep, could be found near the central plaza. Built with mortar and sometimes lined with tiles, the lavandería discharged the dirty water, not into the main acequia, but into the fields. Unlike the synthetic detergents in use today, the lye soap then in use did not damage the crops. More importantly the system, once properly installed, helped assure a more healthy water supply,l3
Some attempts were undertaken to modify the local environment in the effort to raise community health levels. Malaria and yel1ow fever, while never as prevalent on the northem frontier of New Spain as eJsewhere in the Viceroyalty, did make their presence known in riverine oases and in the more humid areas of Texas and Nuevo Santander (Taníaulipas)). The year 1765 was especially bad for malaria in the capital city of Santander. After a tour of inspection by a local military engineer, José de Escandón, perhaps aware that Hippocrates had first established the association between malaria and swamps issued orders for the drainiI1g of some nearby marshess to reduce the anepholine mosquito populations,l4 It was a good idea but drainage techniques 14 Lawrence Francis Hill, José de Escandón and the Founding o! Nuevo were inadequate to the task. Yet an important lesson had been learned. Public health was not simply the province of the physician. Allied science and technology had crucial contributions to make. In addition to the hygienic measures adopted to maintain the integTity of the water supply and the attempts to control the breeding of mosquitos, many civil and religious officials in northern New Spain recognized that an unsafe food supply had a negative impact on public health and not only attempted to regulate slaughterhouses and markets but also circulated information on techniques of food preservation. Preserving meat with aguardiente (brandy) 1night change its flavor but, according to one gastrono1nical savant, one could be sure that the troops in the presidios would not find it disagreeable. 15 Public officials in northern New Spain also appreciated the value of isolation and quarantine to inhibit contagion. In 1781, at the tiII1ie of the foundation of Los Á.ngeles, Lieutenant J osé Zúñiga ordered his recruits and their families to build their settlement one league away from the mission of San Gabriel because some of the newcomers to the area had only recently recovered frO1n smallpox.16 Five years later California governor, Pedro Fages, received more detailed instru:ctions on preventing the spread of smallpox. Forwarding recommendations he had received from Mexico City, Commandant General Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola instructed Governor Fages to build a separate structure for those suspected of having smallpox. It should be built away from the city, taking under consideration the direction of prevailing winds.17
Officials on the northern reaches of the Viceroyalty did not always follow Spanish medical pronouncements. There the principle of "Obedezco pero no cumplo" reached its ultimate enshrinement as countless officials believed that rules were made to be broken. On occasion, however, those charged with enforc- ing public bea!tb in tbe nortb were amazingly scrupulous in observing laws enacted under different circumstances, a balf a world away. One case in point is tbe Roya! Cedula enacted in Madrid in 1761 under tbe title Reglas y precauciones para evitar el uso de ropas y efectos de los éticos y tísicos, y otros enfermos contagiosos. Tbe cedula read in part, "Haciendo ver la experiencia quan peligroso es el uso de la ropa, muebles y alhajas de los que ban adolecido y muerto de enfermedades éticas, tísicas y otras contagiosas, me ba sido muy reparable el abandono con que be entendido se trata la grave importancia de quemar estos efectos. Inoculatioh, or variolation, consists of introducing material frqm a h'Jman smallpox lesion into the body of another person with the hope of producing the disease (variol~ inoculata) in a mil~ form and, at the same time, insuring subsequent immunity. Variolation, however, was not without its opponents in Western Europe. In many cases the negativism never lifted itself above the plane of moral recrimination but a few European scientists correctly pointed out the perils. Because this potentially,effective preventative agaiIist smalrpox was also potentially dangerous it gained only limited acceptance.
IÍ1oculation in Spain began in the late l760s but it occasioned tremendous controversy.22 The debate in Spain was echoed in New Spain in the l770s. Those who wanted guidance from thẽ exico City medical community were treated only to the spec., tacle of lively polemics and endless bickering. Both sides seemed móre interestedin securing forensic "advantage tban in promoting the best interests of their res~ctive constituencies. A small but vocal minority of oppbnents,' ')ed by nr, 1?omingo R'Jsi, succeeded in blocking the general u~ of variolatioJ:1U:nti¡ 17,'i9c , .. 21 Rosaura Hernández ROdríguez, "Epidemias Novohispanas durante el siglo XVI", in Florescano and Malvido (eds.), Epidemias en México, p. 22~~ Treatment f()~ otht:!r epidemic diseases was .dictated by the I:>Dtanical ~ounty of the 1o~1 1~4scape. The ground leaves of the chichi~uelite (Solanum Tligrum or yerbamora) was widely used in the north to treat typhus, but with little effect. See ..Obedeciendo la superior orden espedida por el Sor g9bernador. , :. Dec. 10, ,l783,'Wellco~e \[nstit\lte, WMS. Amer 50. , , , ,?2 J,¡uis S, Gral)jel, La Medicina ~spaño~ de;' Siglo X~III) S,a1i!'m~tlca, ~i- The variolation procedure, properly performed, was quite effective. The degree of protection is illustrated by statistical evidence available from the city of Durango during a smallpox epidemic in 1798. Of 4 308 persons counted in a survey ordered by the Intendent, 3824 had been inoculated and 478 had not. During the course of the 1798 epidemic 102 persons died in Durango, 81 of them of smallpox. Of those persons previously inoculated smallpox claimed only 18 deaths or less than one-half of one percent. Of those 478 not inoculated 63 succumbed to smallpox, or over thirteen percent.81
While the first rounds of smallpox inoculations were unfold. ing in northern N ew Spain the debate in Europe over its efficacy had become extremely intense. British physician Edward Jenner; who as a boy had an extremely severe reaction to a smallpox inoculation, had conducted research into cowpox, a relatively mild disease most prevalent among dairy farmers and others with direct contact with infected cows. Early scientists had observed that persons who had become ill with cowpox seemed to have immunity against smallpox. It was Jenner who proved that contention by demonstrating that smallpox inoculations did not take in the bodies of those who had experienced an earlier cowpox episOde, just as it did not take in the bodies of those who had managed to survive an earlier bout with smallpox. From this knowledge it was a short step to vaccination. He took cowpox pus (fluido bacuna) from the sore on the hand of a dairy maid and injected it into the arm of a young boy. Six weeks l~ter the saíne boy had no reactio~ whatsoever when ipoculated with s~allpox pus. .Jenner published his results in London in 1798. His Inquiry intQ the Causes and .Effect$ Qf the VariQla Vaccinae immediately ()CcasiQned major debates in the Europe:an m~dica1 community. VacGina~ion, a&()pposed to inoculation or variolation, was not embraced with universal enthusiasm but by lSOO Jenrier's experim~nts h~d been r~peated with the same rc~ults son many times tbat it w~s di{ficult to deny the forcefulness of his arguments. : Vaccina~ion Wa~ adopted in Spain in late 1800, by physiclans Fran~isGo PigJ;li1lern and Francisco Salvá y Campillo S2 but major problerl1s eAsued following the decision to introduce it in Spain:s American colQnies. Because the vaccine breaks down and desiccates it was difficult to preserve it in an active state and transport for lQng distances. Attem,pts to keep the fluid active in crude vacuuJll containers met with mixed results. One shi pment sent to Mexico in 1802 was worthless by the time it arrived.33 In 1803, how~ver, King Charles JV ordered the; formation for the express purpose of transporting the vaccine. to Americ~ and then tbe Philippines, The Expedición ~ilantrópica de la Vacuna was organized by pr. Francisto Xavier Balr:nis, the personal physician of King Charles IV and a man who had served the 'Crown in Mexico previ9usly, collectjng informa,tion of herbal medicines. Balmis first thought of transporting cows sick with cowpox to the new world but uJtimately judged this s'cheme to be.im,practical. He then decided upon another plan, arm to arm vaccination to keep the fluid active during the diffi1:d1t Atlantic ciossing,S4 , In the early fall of 1803 Dr. Ba1mis ~nd his assistants visil:ed (;)rphanages in Santiago de CompOsteJa and La Coruña and identified twenty-five orphaned chi1drcn who bad never had small POx. They would form part of his expedition¡ When tbe Ma,ría Pita set sai1 for America on November 30, 1803 two of the children had already been vaccinated. From their arms on the ninth or tenth day came the cowpox vacclne to be transfeẽ~ to a subsequent .pair. The process continued"frotn pair to 32 Granjel, La Medicina Española del Siglo XPIll, p. 124. , ~ lbid., p. 137;
.
, \34 The expeditiOn is detailed in Gonzalo Dfazde Yraola; La Vuelta al Mun;. dp de la. Expedició~ de la Vacuna, Sevilla, Escuela ~e &tudiosc Hispano-Americanos, 1948.
pair during the entire voyage. The vaccine and all but one of the children arrived safely in San Juan, Puerto Rico on February 9, 1804.35 Balmis was in for a surprise. Medical authorities in Puerto Rico had managed to acquire a good supply of vaccine sent in vacuumed glass slides from the neighboring Danish island of St. Croix. Rather than been pleased that the vaccination was already underway the leader of the scientific expedition chastised local officials for anticipating his arrival and jumping the gun.36 After obtaining a new group of children the expedition continued to Venezuela where it divided itself into two groups. Dr. José Salvany took some of the children with him on a tour of Spanish South America while Dr. Balmis took the remainder to Havana, Cuba and then' on to the New Spain's gulf port of Veracruz. .Dr. Balmis, no stranger to controversy, did not anticipate the reCeption he received in Veracruz in the summer of 1804. As he began actively vaccinating orphaned children and soldiers in the local garrison the towns folk exploded against him. His Iriedical knowledge greatly exceeded his appreciation of group psychology. Nothing 'had been done to prepare the Veracruz citizenry for massive campaign of vaccination and the people lashed out against him as an assassin of children. Even the local doctors in the port city opposed him. It took a visit from Vice. roy J osé de Iturrigaray and commissioners of the Protomedicato, complete with cereIl'lonial trappings, to calm matters down in VeracrUz. The surprise visit culminated with a wonderfully chivalric productions staged by the Viceroy. After leading his Mexico City entourage in a parade through the streets of Veracruz he confronted the assassination hysteria head on by a1low-ing Dr. Juan Arboleya; a, professor of medicine, to publicly vaccinate his own young son.37 The significance was obvic;>usly more symbolic than genuine. .As the expedition moved on to Mexico City and then to .the far corners of the viceroyalty news of the drama at Veracruz preceeded it. The viceroy was insistent that the procedure be adopted on a wide scale and even established a special agency in the Hospicio de los Pobres, "for the conservation and propagation of the vaccine fluid for the entire kingdom."38 His resolution exacerbated the tension between tradition and innovation. The vaccination campaign was greeted almost everywhere with either mistrust or open hostility. Not a few parents had their children vaccinated to the taunts of their neighbors but by the late summer of 1804 children carrying the precious fluid in their arms had been dispatched to northem N ew Spain. Nemesio Salcedo, the comroandant general in Chihuahua City and an uncompromising exponent of vaccination urged the governors of the Provincias Internas to begin making preparations for extensive vaccination campaigns.S9 In complementary measure, the Bishop of Sonora, also anticipating a negative reaction, asked all missionaries in his diocese to educate the public and promote the many advantages of compliance with the vaccination effort.4() Compliance in the north was better than anticipated. Only Alta California, a province that had not yet been visited by a serious sm:allpox epidemic, was hesitant to accept the claims that the prophylaxis was safe and effective.41 The other northern provinces were easier to convince as they had suffered tremendously in 1780-1781 and again more recently in 1798-1799. The province of New Mexico affords one excellent example of the northern vaccination effort set in motion by the Balmis expedition. It centers around an obscure New Mexican practitioner, don Cristóbal Larrañaga.
From the time of the Oñate expedition of 1598 New Mexico went for almost two centuries without a genuine doctor. Larrañaga, the first formal1y trained surgeon to enter the New Mexican province, began practicing in Santa Fe in the late 1780s. Although a civilian, he served as the surgeon of the Santa Fe presidio for over two decades. Unhappy with his modest salary he once asked the govemor of New Mexico for a raise. Governor Fernando de la Concha forwarded the request to Commandant General J acobo U garte de Loyola in Chihuahua City. The petition was t;11timately denied as Governor de la Concha was reminded of a recent royal order asking public officials to economize because of strains on the royal treasury.42 Dr. Larrañaga's salary was not high but he had been able to supplement it by private practice in the Santa Fe community.
Governor de la Concha's successor, Fernando Chac6n, did not get along well with the Santa Fe surgeon. On one occasion, in 1801, the new Governor even reported to the Commandant General that Dr. Larrañaga was reading potentially dangerous books. He asked his superior to determine if the titles appeared on the Index Libroru.m Prohibitorum of the Holy Office of the Inquisition.
The Commandant General checked with local church officials and responded that the books were not proscribed but he would open a file on the matter just in case other suspicious matters were reported.43 N o new evidence had been uncovered when the Governor of N ew Mexico received specific instructions to begin a vaccination cam¡paign in his province. Writing from Chihuahua City, the capital of the Provincias Internas, Commandant General N emesio Salcedo dispatched the following communique to Santa Fe in the late summer of 1804.
Acreditado en España y casi en toda Europa el descubrimiento dela inoculacion de la bacuna como el mas eficaz preventivo delas viruelas naturales he conseguido a beneficio delas providencias mas activas y eficaces verla establecida en esta villa. Ya se ha propagado a algunOs pueblos y puestos militares y con el fin de que en el correr de fin del actual año hagase comprehender el Cirujano Dn Christoval Larrañaga trayendo en su compañia seis u ocho hijos de la tropa o vecinos pra que en ellos se conduzca el fluido inoculando de brazo a brazo quando regresaren de aqui, pues es el medio mas seguro de transmitirlo.
Deve auxiliar para el viaje al expresado cirujano y niños que tragere, sobre cuyo particular tomara V .S. la resolucion que crea justa, en inteligencia de que lo seria en mi concepto que estos y asatalos [sic] Th~. Commandant Genera1 had made a concession, a1beit a muted one, to the idea of socialized medicine. He did so noõ ut of asense of compassion. The issue was not that the disad., vantaged would be unable to pay the COStS. Rath~r Nemesio Salcedo understood clearly that this venture in public health required near universa1 compliance if it were t() be.effective. 45 As the details for Dr. Larrañaga's trip were made, it was decid~d that he would pay his own costs but would recuperate his losses and eventua11y show a modest profit as he would be a11ow~d to charge the gunpowder tax fund between one 4nd one a half r.eales per vaccination. ~ The doctor was :not going to become rich overnight. He wou1d earn one peso for every five to eight persons he vaccinated. 47 Dr. Larrañaga trave11ed to Chihual1ua City with the Santa Fe children in the winter of 1804-1805. There he not onlyreceived the necessary vaccine but also instruction in how to keep the s:upply going.48 He began the retum trip to S4llta Fe in March, 1805, vaccinating children in the ~mal1 towns of northern Chihuahua and southem New Mexico as he proceeded north. Ou one occasion he almost lQst his su pply qf, vaccine as Qne of the children recently inocu1ated contracted 1eprosy and Larrañaga did not want totake th~ chance of using the vaccine~-frQm this child. Like Balmis before him, he had the foresight, however , to vaccinate his little travel1ing crew in pairs so that on this occasion he was able to obtain the necessary f1uid from the second child. By the time he retumed to Santa Fe he had vaccinated 257 chi1dren in seven towns and missions. He reported that he would have vaccinated even more except for the fact that he couldn't apply the procedure to many because they were so sick with measles, dysentery or whooping cough.~9 It was only the beginning. By November, 1805, the number of vaccinated children in the New Mexico province had jumped to 3610.
If frontier medica1 practice often brought out the worst in men, Dr. Larrañaga's career indicates that it sometimes inspired the best. With a dedication that must e1icit admiration. for the next five years the tireless doctor travelled from town to town vaccinating thousands of additional children between the ages of one and four. In those cases where the vaccination did not take, he would return and repeat the procedure to ensure that his previous supply of vaccine had noi been bad.oo On1y once during the five-year period did he made a serious blunder. Through carelessness in the late summer of 1808 he a11owed his supp1y of vaccine to run out. By September, however, a shipme~t of dried cowpox scabs was on its way to Santa Fe from Chihuahua City with a terse reminder from the commandant general that the doctor should be more careful.51. The sco1ding was followed a few days later by a set of instructions on how to constitute a new supply of vaccine from the dried scabs. s~ toman corno dies o dose costras y remolidas en un Almires mui limpio se pone el polvo en un papel y con gota de agua comun se espera en términos de que quedeen una masita mui flexible y con la punta de la lanceta o Abuja se toma y se introduce a los niños lo mismo que si fuera fluido bacuno respecto a que hace los mismos efectos y aun es mas segura que prenda la Viruela executandose la inoculacion con el fluido a las costras.52
By October, 1809, Larrañaga was back in business vaccinating 152 children, all under the age of four, in the town of Santa Cruz de la Cañada, north of Santa Fe.53
Cristóbal Larrañaga gradually wore himself out vaccinating the young children of New Mexico. His sacrifices went largely unrewarded and unacclaimed. By 1810 he had trained a younger man, Antonio Ruiz, to take over for him. Ruiz, although without fonn;al medical credentials, also proved to be a man of great energy. In the fall of 1810 he vaccinated 1 286 chi1dren between the ages of one and eight. 54 The governor of the province authorized him the stingy payment of one real per vaccination. 55 Vaccination efforts elsewhere in the far north encountered only sporadic successes. Compliance was good to excellent in the provinces of Chihuahua and Nuevo León as the effort got under way in the winter of 1804. Government officials and medical practitioners in Coahuila and Texas, however, procrastinated and allowed their supplies of cowpox to evaporate before even initiating the vaccination effort. The supply was eventually reconstituted from fluid and scabs obtained in Monterrey,56 but these two areas were already over a year behind other regions of the far north. In the late spring of 1807 the Commandant General asked for a full report explaining the degree of compliance with vaccination regulations and requesting the number of people that had been vaccinated.57 If an answer was ever sent a copy was not deposited in the official archives. A year later the irascible Commandant N eIn¡esio Salcedo was still chiding Texas Govemor Antonio Cordero about the slow progress,58 but by this time there are indications that vaccinations of children was being performed on a regular basis. 59 The Texas record was not as good as other areas of the north and, as late as 1815 officials were still allowing their supply of vaccine to dry out.60
The overall impact of the vaccination effort in northern New Spain was substantial. Smallpox was not conquered but its general devastation unquestionably was muted. In the twenty years prior to the first northern vaccination thirteen smallpox epidemics are recorded in the far north. During the twenty year period following the vaccination effort only six significant outbreaks can be counted. The reduced number of epidemics reveals only one measure of success. The mortality rate in those coInImunities hit by smallpox also fell as greater percentage of young children, traditionally vulnerable, emerged unscathed. I t is clear that northerners bom at the end of the colonial period, both Indians and non-Indians, stood a better chance than their parents or grandparents of escaping. the dreaded small pox.
Medical care on the northern frontier of New Spain was pitifully inadequate. An insufficient number of doctors left the practice of medicine largely to the empirics, many of whom were incompetent even by the standards of the day. Medicines and medical instruments were always in short supply. Most northem towns had no hospitals and even those facilities referred to as hospitals were in reality single room infirmaries where one might hope to encounter a visiting doctotr or at least competent bleeder. And when doctors and med.icines were available their costs were often prohibitive, except for the select few. But public health measures did make an impact. A century before the scientific study of bacteriology and immunology it helped to educate the public and to contain many of the most devastating effects of contamination and contagion. Without it the sad state of frontier health would have been even worse.
